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PROBATION FOR CORPORATIONS UNDER THE
SENTENCING REFORM ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutions of corporate crime' are increasing, and convictions
of criminal corporations are becoming increasingly commonplace.2
Sanctions against corporate defendants, however, have historically
been too lenient.3 A corporation has "no soul to be damned, and no
body to be kicked, ' 4 and therefore cannot be imprisoned. Dissolution
of a corporation remains disfavored as a sanction for public policy
reasons.' Thus until recently, the only direct penal sanction available
has been a fine. Current legal literature on the subject of fines as a
way of sentencing corporations suggests that fines are not an effective
deterrent to criminal corporations."
The record of a single corporation exemplifies the ineffective-
ness of fines in controlling illegal corporate activity. In 1965, the
Olin Corporation was fined $30,000 for filing false statements to
t' 1986 by James D. Curran
1. Corporate crime is defined as the "conduct of a corporation, or of individuals acting
on behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and punishable by law." Braithwaite & Geis, On
Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 292, 294
(1982).
2. Between 1976 and 1979, 574 corporations were convicted of a variety of crimes in
federal courts. See Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Scholarship, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501, 501 n.4 (1980). Fortune magazine reported that between 1970 and
1980, 11% of the 1,043 major corporations it surveyed were involved in a "major delinquency"
(a term it defined to include five crimes: bribery, criminal fraud, illegal political contributions,
and price fixing or bid rigging antitrust violations). See Ross, How Lawless Are Big Compa-
nies?, FoRTuNt., Dec. 1, 1980, at 56-57.
3. See Orland, supra note 2, at 512-13 & n.69.
4. "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be
damned, and no body to be kicked?" Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806), quoted in
Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981).
5. Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Cor-
porate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, at 373-74 n.119 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note]. See
also infra note 40.
6. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959). See also infra
note 41 and accompanying text.
7. Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 303; Coffee, supra note 4, at 386-87; Comment,
Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion?, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 637, 637-38 (1984); Orland, supra note 2, at 516-17.
786 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
conceal kickback payments.' Again in 1978, Olin was fined $45,000
for filing false reports to hide illegal shipments of arms to South
Africa.9 Once more in 1979, Olin filed false statements to conceal the
amount of mercury discharged into the Niagara River and was fined
$70,000.10 Unfortunately, Olin's record is not unique, as fines are
viewed by many corporate offenders as merely a cost of doing
business. 1
Initially, courts addressed the problem of the inadequacy of
fines in controlling corporate criminal behavior.1" Some courts used
the Federal Probation Act' s to fashion sentencing alternatives for
corporate defendants." These sentences were described as being
"creative, innovative, and imaginative." '' Yet, because the Probation
Act did not specifically address corporations, 6 and because there was
a lack of definitive sentencing guidelines for corporations," courts
which applied the Probation Act to criminal corporations produced
varying results. 8 Furthermore, members of Congress, judges, and
8. United States v. Olin Corp., No. 63-217, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept 23, 1965).
9. United States v. Olin Corp., No. 78-30, slip op. (D. Conn. June 1, 1978).
10. United States v. Olin Corp., No. 78-38, slip op. (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1979).
11. Orland, supra note 2, at 516.
12. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972) (authorized
probation for corporations).
13. Probation System Act, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1982)), repealed by The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1987, 1988 (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (c)(1)).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982)
(defendants required to contribute funds and assign executive to community service organiza-
tion); United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (1982) (contribute funds to chari-
table organizations) overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542
(8th Cir. 1984) (a federal district court may not impose on a willing corporation as a condition
of probation, in lieu of a fine, the requirement that it contribute money to a charitable organi-
zation that has not suffered actual damages or loss from corporation's criminal offense); United
States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (donate baked goods to
charitable organizations).
15. William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 913.
16. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 60 (1972). In authorizing
probation as a corporate sanction, the court in Atlantic Richfield simply concluded that be-
cause corporations are subject to the criminal code and because the Probation Act is part of
that criminal code, corporations can be put on probation. Id. at 60-61.
17. The Probation Act was written for individuals, and was only subsequently applied
to corporations. "[Njowhere can be found mention of rehabilitating a corporate offender
(within the Probation Act] while the record is replete with discussion of youthful and first-time
offenders, in addition to references to "he" or "him" and "defendant." These references ...
indicate that Congress meant the Act to apply only to persons and not corporations." Id. at 60.
18. Compare William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 911 (approving contributions to charitable
organizations as a condition of probation) overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Con-
str. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) (a federal district court may not impose on a willing
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scholars became critical of the scope of judicial discretion in fashion-
ing remedies. 9
On October 12, 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act of 19840 (Sentencing Act) as a part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984.2" The effective date of the Sentencing
Act is November 1, 1986.2" Although this new law repeals the Fed-
eral Probation Act, 23  provisions for probation are integrated
throughout the Sentencing Act.24 These provisions explicitly state
that a convicted corporation may be given a sentence2 5 of probation26
as well as a fine.2 7
In sentencing a convicted criminal corporation to probation
under the Sentencing Act, courts must consider several factors.
Among these factors are the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the offender,2 ' and the purposes of
sentencing29 (just punishment,80  deterrence,"' incapacitation, 2 and
corporation as a condition of probation, in lieu of a fine, the requirement that it contribute
money to a charitable organization that has not suffered actual damages or loss from corpora-
tion's criminal offense), with United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982)
(disapproving contributions to charitable organizations as a condition of probation).
19. See, e.g., S. RE p. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 38 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report]; Dershowitz, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 629
(1977).
20. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE & CONG.
AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 1987, 1988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551) [hereinafter cited as
Sentencing Act].
21. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE
& CONG. AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 1976 (1984).
22. The Sentencing Act was passed on October 12, 1984. All pertinent portions of the
Sentencing Act, with the exception of those portions regarding the Sentencing Commission,
take effect on November 1, 1986. The portion of the Sentencing Act establishing the Sentenc-
ing Commission took effect on the date of the enactment, October 12, 1984. The guidelines and
policy statements promulgated by the Commission will take effect within two years of the
enactment date, pending congressional review. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, § 235(a)(1) (98
Stat.), at 2031-33.
23. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, § 212(2) (98 Stat.), at 1987.
24. The main probation provisions are in Chapter 227, subchapter B. Id. at 1992-95 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. 3561-66).25. Under the Sentencing Act, probation constitutes a sentence. Under the preceding
law of the Federal Probation Act, probation was imposed by the court after it had suspended
sentence. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 67.
26. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c)(1)).
See infra note 127.
27. Id. at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2)).
28. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).
29. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). See infra note 126.
30. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(A)).
31. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)).
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rehabilitation"8 ). The legislative history of the Sentencing Act em-
phasizes that courts have the authority to impose any probationary
condition which may be appropriate for a particular defendant.34
Procedural provisions contained in the Sentencing Act, such as the
presentence report, 8  Sentencing Commission guidelines,36 and ap-
pellate review, 87 will ensure that probation as a sanction will not be
abused.
This comment examines the application of probation to criminal
corporations under the Sentencing Act. In the following section, the
traditional sanctions for corporations convicted of criminal conduct
are discussed. Section III presents a brief history of the attempts to
impose conditions of probation on corporations. Section IV analyzes
the Sentencing Act as it pertains to probation for criminal corpora-
tions. Guidelines for sentencing criminal corporations to probation
32. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)).
33. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)).
34. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 95-99.
The list is not exhaustive, and it is not intended at all to limit the court's op-
tions-conditions of a nature very similar to, or very different from, those set
forth may also be imposed. . . . The conditions . : . are simply designed to
provide the trial court with a suggested listing of some of the available alterna-
tives which might be desirable in the sentencing of a particular offender. [foot-
note omitted) It is anticipated that . . . the court will review the listed examples
in light of the Sentencing Commission's guidelines and policy statements, weigh
other possibilities suggested by the case, and, after evaluation, impose those that
appear to be appropriate under all the circumstances.
Id. at 95.
35. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1988-89 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3552). See
infra note 125.
36. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 2019-24 (to be'codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
Section 994 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members of the Com-
mission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and consistent with all perti-
nent provisions of this title and title 18, United States Code, shall promulgate
and distribute to all courts of the United States and to the United States Proba-
tion System-() guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a sentencing
court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case. . . . (2)
general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other
aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commis-
sion would further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of Title 18,
United States Code ...
Id.
37. Id. at 2011-13 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742). Section 3742 provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) APPEAL BY A DEFENDANT.-A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the
district court for review of an otherwise final sentence. ...
(b) APPEAL BY THE GOVERNMENT.-The Government may file a notice of ap-
peal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence. ...
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are proposed in Section V. Finally, Section VI presents the author's
conclusion that the implementation of the guidelines proposed in
Section V will assist judges in fashioning appropriate conditions of
probation in sentencing criminal corporations under the Sentencing
Act.
II. SANCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CORPORATIONS
Historically, the only practical sanction available for corpora-
tions convicted of a criminal offense has been a fine." Essentially,
there are two reasons for this limitation in sentencing. First, corpo-
rations are legal fictions, and as such have not been subject to sanc-
tions designed for individuals (i.e. prison and probation)." Second,
courts are reluctant to use dissolution of a criminal corporation as a
sanction.'0 The result is that fines have been the primary method
used to control corporate criminal behavior.'
The rationale behind the use of fines in sentencing is deter-
rence.' 2 Corporatioris are presumed to act rationally in their profit-
making ventures.4 The establishment of a system of fines was
designed to make corporate crime unprofitable, thus deterring ra-
tional corporations from criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the use of
fines as a deterrence is rendered ineffective through a phenomenon
known as the 'deterrence trap." 4 The "deterrence trap" occurs
when the size of the fine that is necessary to deter criminal conduct
by a corporation is larger than that which the corporation is able to
38. Note, supra note 5, at 354."
39. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS - THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR 36 (1975).
40. Note, supra note 5, at 373-74 n.119. Dissolution is not considered an option for
several reasons:
First, a court of one jurisdiction will lack authority to revoke the charter of a
corporation chartered under the laws of another. Second, as to small or closely
held [corporations], dissolution alone does not prevent the controlling parties
from simply regrouping in a new form. Finally, as to large corporations, the
socially disruptive effects of the dissolution of a whole corporation would gener-
ally be so great as to outweigh its benefits.
Id.
41. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 354 n.8. See also C. STONE, supra note 39, at 35-37 (the law has responded
to the growth of corporations simply by transferring theories and sanctions previously applied
to individuals instead of developing a new body of law which would be more applicable to a
corporation).
43. Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1365 (1979).
44. See generally Coffee, supra note 4, at 389-93 (describing the "deterrence trap").
19861
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
pay. 4 A description of the "deterrence trap" is as follows:
The crux of the dilemma arises from the fact that the maximum
meaningful fine that can be levied against any corporate of-
fender is necessarily bounded by its wealth. Logically, a small
corporation is no more threatened by a $5 million fine than by a
$500,000 fine if both are beyond its ability to pay. In the case of
an individual offender, this wealth ceiling on the deterrent
threat of fines causes no serious problem because we can still
deter by threat of incarceration. But for the corporation, which
has no body to incarcerate, this wealth boundary seems an abso-
lute limit on the reach of deterrent threats directed at it. If the
"expected punishment cost" necessary to deter a crime crosses
this threshold, adequate deterrence cannot be achieved. . . .In
short, our ability to deter the corporation may be confounded by
our inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not
exceed the corporation's resources.' 6
Even if adequate fines are imposed, however, other problems arise
when monetary penalties are the sole sanction used to control corpo-
rate criminal behavior.
The use of fines may also work injustice on innocent parties.
The real cost of a fine may be borne not by the corporation, but by
the shareholders through lower dividends and by the consumers
through higher prices.' 7 Neither of these parties has significant con-
trol over corporate-decision making.' 8 Furthermore, depending on
the characteristics of the relevant market, heavily fining a corpora-
tion may lead to non-management employee layoffs as well as to
other forms of detriment to innocent third parties." Thus, raising
the level of fines will not prevent a corporation from passing along
the penalty.
Profit maximization is not a complete explanation of corporate
criminal behavior. 50 People still make the decision and take the ac-
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id. (footnotes omitted).
47. Coffee, supra note 4, at 401-02; Note, supra note 5, at 362-63; Orland, supra note
2, at 516; see Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 60.
48. Note, supra note 5, at 355-57. See also C. STONE, supra note 39, at 47-48 (in most
major corporations the shares are divided among so many people that the shareholders are
relatively incapable of concerted action to remove management).
49. Coffee, supra note 4, 401-02. See also United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F.
Supp 1159, 1166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (fines large enough to achieve the appropriate measure
of deterrence would bankrupt the corporate defendants and cause widespread unemployment
among the bakeries' employees as well as damage the economies of the communities in which
the plants were located).
50. See C. SToNE, supra note 39, at 36-38; Coffee, supra note 4, at 393; Note, supra
[Vol. 26
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tion for criminal conduct. 1 An individual manager may perceive il-
legal conduct to be in his interest, even if such conduct exposes the
corporation to potential costs which far exceed the potential bene-
fits. 5 Thus, the behavioral perspective suggests that "it may be ex-
traordinarily difficult to prevent corporate misconduct by punishing
only the firm [with a fine]." 58
The multi-divisional and often radically decentralized" struc-
ture of the modern corporation also acts to weaken the deterrence
value of fines."5 While it is the top management which sets the direc-
tives of the corporation," it is often up to the middle-level managers
to meet those directives. 7 This tends to insulate the top management
(which may well desire that the sordid details of "meeting the com-
petition" not filter up to its attention) and intensify the pressures on
those below." As a result, the top management, which is generally
the most concerned with profit maximization, is often unaware of the
criminal conduct by the middle-level managers.5 9 This dilemma may
be explained in the following manner:
For the middle level official the question is not whether the be-
havior is too risky to be in the interests of the corporation from
a cost/benefit standpoint. Rather, it is: which risk is greater -
the criminal conviction of the company or his own dismissal for
failure to meet targets set by an unsympathetically demanding
senior management. Because the conviction of the corporation
falls only indirectly on the middle manager, it can seldom ex-
ceed the penalty that dismissal or demotion means to him."
In fact, the threat of a fine does little to deter middle-level criminal
note 5, at 364.
51. This point is often forgotten in the difficulty of identifying the people within the
structure of the corporation responsible for the offense. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 393; Note,
supra note 5, at 357-58.
52. Coffee, supra note 4, at 393.
53. Id.
54. See C. STONE, supra note 39, at 43-44; Coffee, supra note 4, at 399; Note, supra
note 5, at 357-59.
55. Other factors which weaken the deterrence include a variety of penalties and incen.
tives (such as salary and fringe benefits, increased or diminished staff and budget, and the
threat of dismissal or demotion) of the people within the corporation. See generally Coffee,
supra note 4, at 393-400.
56. Id. at 398.
57. Id.
58. C. STONE, supra note 39, at 60-62; Coffee, supra note 4, at 397-98; Note, supra
note 5, at 357-58.
59. C. STONE, supra note 39, at 60-62; Coffee, supra note 4, at 397-98; Note, supra
note 5, at 357-58.
60. Coffee, supra note 4, at 399.
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conduct.
Fines alone do not address the complexities of corporate crimi-
nal behavior. Although a monetary penalty is a useful sanction in
sentencing a criminal corporation, it is not adequate as a sole remedy
to control corporate criminal activity. In response to this inadequacy,
new sanctions must be developed and employed in sentencing crimi-
nal corporations. Probation is one such sanction.
III. CASES APPLYING PROBATION As A SANCTION To CRIMINAL
CORPORATIONS
In 1972, a new form of sanction for corporate crime was au-
thorized in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co."' In Atlantic
Richfield, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a corpora-
tion could be placed on probation." Unfortunately, the court did not
provide any rationale for placing corporations on probation. In au-
thorizing probation as a sanction for criminal corporations, the court
simply reasoned that because corporations are subject to the criminal
code," and because the Probation Act4' was part of the criminal
code, corporations can be put on probation."' After authorizing pro-
bation as a sanction for criminal corporations, however, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order of proba-
tion.66 The appellate court summarily determined that the conditions
of the probation were unreasonable and went beyond what was in-
tended by the drafters of the Probation Act.
67
The authorization of probation and the accompanying discretion
to set the terms and conditions of probation had the potential to ex-
pand a trial court's flexibility in sentencing criminal corporations.
The Atlantic Richfield decision, however, ultimately limited that po-
tential in its failure to clarify to what extent a trial court could exer-
cise its discretion when placing a corporation on probation."'
61. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
62. Id. at 61.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1-6005 (1982). "[Pjrovisions of the criminal code make it clear that the
term 'defendant' may include corporate parties .. " Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 61.
64. Probation System Act, supra note 13, at § 3651.
65. Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 60-61. "It is not logical . . . to subject corporations
to certain criminal statutes and yet exclude them from others for, after all, the Probation Act is
but a portion of the United States' codified criminal laws under Title 18 of the United States
Code." Id. at 60.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id.
68. After authorizing probation as a sanction for criminal corporations, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals summarily overruled the trial court's probationary conditions and held:
[Vol. 26
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In United States v. Allied Chemical Corporation,9 Allied
Chemical was fined $13.24 million after pleading no contest to
charges of water pollution70 resulting from the escape of Kepone, a
pesticide, into the waterways of Virginia.7 ' The trial court, however,
stated that it would be inclined to reduce the sentence if Allied
Chemical took steps to alleviate the damage it had caused.7 ' Allied
Chemical agreed to spend $8.35 million to establish the Virginia En-
vironmental Endowment, a nonprofit corporation empowered to
"fund scientific research projects and implement remedial projects
and other programs to help alleviate the problem that Kepone had
created . . . and . . . enhance and improve the overall quality of the
environment in Virginia. . . ,,17 The fine was then reduced to $5
million.7
The results of this sentence were both immediate and long last-
ing. First, Allied Chemical established an organization to clean up
the toxic pollution quickly and efficiently. Moreover, the sentence
apparently caused Allied 'Chemical to develop a number of effective
systems of internal environmental control.75
In United States v. Mitsubishi International Corp.,7 three cor-
porate defendants were indicted and pled guilty to numerous counts
of violating the Elkins Act. 77 At first, the maximum fine was im-
posed as a penalty on each of the defendants.7 8 Later, however, all
but one thousand dollars of the fine for each count was suspended,
and each defendant was placed on probation for three years . The
terms of probation required that each corporation loan a company
executive for one year to the National Alliance for Business in its
Community Alliance Program for Ex-Offenders, and make a
$10,000 donation to the program for each offense.80
"[W]hen probation is used as a means of imposing unreasonable standards to the extent that
the probationer may not know when they are satisfied, we must object to such unauthorized
use. It is for that reason we reverse .. " Id. at 61.
69. 420 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976).
70. The charges were violations of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
71. Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REV.
970 (1974).
72. Stone, Slap on the Wrist for.the Kepone Mob, 22 Bus. & Soc'/ REV. 4, 8 (1977).
73. Fisse, supra note 71, at 974 (quoting Stone, supra note 72, at 8).
74. Stone, supra note 72, at 8.
75. Fisse, supra note 71, at 975 n.29.
76. 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982 ! .
77. Id. at 786.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 787 n.l.
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In sentencing the defendants in Mitsubishi, the district court
was concerned that the large corporations could "just write a check
and walk away.""1 It was for this reason that that court designed the
unique and creative conditions of probation. Although the defendants
objected to the conditions,82 the prosecution strongly supported both
conditions, stating:
To suggest . . . that community service would be of no rehabil-
itative or deterrent value, is quite presumptuous. That sugges-
tion would be valid .. .only if defendants were conclusively
proven not to be in need of rehabilitation or if it was unreasona-
ble to assume that corporate concern for compliance with the
law would be encouraged by corporate community service."8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the probationary condi-
tions." t In justifying its decision, the court stated that a judge has a
wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose, and as long
as that sentence is within statutory limits, it will generally not be
disturbed. 5
An important case in applying probation to corporations was
United States v. William Anderson Co.86 In William Anderson, the
corporate defendants and individual officers of the corporations
pleaded guilty to violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.87 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the various recom-
mended sentences, and imposed fines upon each of the corporate de-
fendants.88 Thereafter, the court suspended the sentences and placed
all the defendants on probation.8 The terms of probation required
that each corporation make a contribution to a specified public or
charitable organization in lieu of the fines imposed.90 Generally, the
donees were the organizations for whom the convicted officers were
81. Id. at 788.
82. Id.
83. Brief for Appellee at 42-43, United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785
(9th Cir. 1982).
84. Mitsubishi, 677 F.2d at 788.
85. Id.
86. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982), overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Con-
str. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) (a federal district court may not impose on a willing
corporation as a condition of probation, in lieu of a fine, the requirement that it contribute
money to a charitable organization that has not suffered actual damages or loss from the cor-
poration's criminal offense).
87. 698 F.2d at 911.





required to work as part of their individual sentences." The re-
quired contributions were equal to the amount of the original fines
levied.92
In its sentencing memorandum, the court of appeals expressed
the purpose of rehabilitation and deterrence" in fashioning the con-
ditions of probation. 4 Moreover, the court held that the contention
that corporate entities were incapable of rehabilitation "smack[ed] of
medieval antiquarianism" in that it ignored the fact that the deci-
sion-making was made by people." The court determined that such
decision-making could be affected through appropriate conditions of
probation. 6 The court stated that insistence on the fiction of a corpo-
ration as being a bloodless entity was a fiction in itself.'
In United States v. Danilow Pastry Co.," six wholesale baker-
ies in the New York metropolitan area and six individuals who were
principals of those bakeries were indicted on violations of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act." The defendants entered a plea of nolo con-
tendere, and were convicted.100 The sentences were fines, which
were partially suspended, and the companies were placed on proba-
tion. 01 As a condition of probation, the defendants were required to
donate specified amounts of fresh-baked goods to various needy and
charitable organizations.10 2 The amount of goods donated by a par-
ticular defendant over a period of time would equal the amount of
the suspended fine for that defendant.'"
In formulating the sentences, the Danilow court sought punish-
ment that would compensate for the reduced deterrent effect of the
nolo pleas. 1' The court, after reviewing the extensive financial data
submitted by the parties, concluded that the fines necessary "to
achieve the appropriate measure of deterrence would bankrupt the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. "The alternative sentences will be designed to be firm, specific, unpleasant for the
defendants and constructive for them and others." Id.
94. "If the community service features of the sentences are correctly devised they will
not have decreased the amount of punishment, but will have increased the usefulness and
decreased the expensiveness of it." Id.
95. Id. at 914.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
99. Id. at 1161.
100. Id. at 1162.
101. Id. at 1163.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1166.
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corporate defendants."' 05 Such a sentence would cause widespread
unemployment among the bakeries' employees, and damage the
economies of the communities in which the plants were located.'06
The Danilow court noted that rehabilitation and specific deter-
rence against future price fixing by the six corporations would be
enhanced in that the executives and workers of the companies would
be made aware, on a continuous basis during the term of the proba-
tion, of the violations perpetrated by their company, the need for
restitution, and the need to guard against similar violations in the
future.' Furthermore, the wrongdoings of the defendants would be
called to public attention; the public would be made aware of the
community service and symbolic restitution; the punishment would
be increased beyond what fines could extract; and the needs of the
innocent employees, customers, and communities would be
secured.' 08
The benefits of the use of probation in sentencing criminal cor-
porations are exemplified by the above cases. The sentences in these
cases are laudable in that the courts recognized the inadequacies of
existing sanctions and fashioned new sentences using probationary
conditions that were more responsive to the needs of the communities
and the defendants. The cases may be criticized, however, in that
they often failed to justify the conditions of probation'0 9 and to pro-
vide guidelines for the conditions of the sentence." 0 Furthermore,
the cases illustrate that the courts were constrained by the sentencing
options available in the Probation Act."'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1166-67.
107. Id. at 1167.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Prescon, 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1983).
110. See Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d at 58.
111. The statute elaborated on the general grant of discretion by specifying a number of
different conditions of probation that the trial court may impose. With respect to monetary
payments, the statute provided that:
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for ac-
tual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and
May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose support
he is legally responsible.
Probation System Act, supra note 13. Though the statute did not expressly forbid the imposi-
tion of other kinds of monetary payments than those enumerated, courts concluded that the
enumeration should be construed as a limitation on the authority of the courts to exact mone-
tary payments as a condition of probation. See generally United States v. Wright Contracting
Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir.
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Although the foregoing cases indicate that probation is a suita-
ble and effective sanction in sentencing criminal corporations, the
cases also indicate that the limitations of the Probation Act had to be
addressed. Definitive guidelines that would not inhibit a trial court's
discretion in fashioning appropriate conditions of probation were
needed. In answer to this need, Congress passed the Sentencing Re-
form Act."' The Sentencing Act's sweeping provisions were
designed to structure judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate indeter-
minate sentencing, and make criminal sentencing fairer and more
certain. 1
IV. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841" represents the first com-
prehensive sentencing law to be applied by the federal courts."' The
Act is "the culmination of a reform effort begun more than a decade
ago by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws.""" Noting the importance of this sentencing reform, Attorney
General William French Smith stated:
Of the improvements [under consideration by the Committee]
. ..perhaps the most important are those related to sentencing
criminal offenders. These provisions introduce a totally new and
comprehensive sentencing system that is based upon a coherent
philosophy. They rely upon detailed guidelines for sentencing
similarly situated offenders in order to provide for a greater cer-
tainty and uniformity in sentencing. 17
The Sentencing Act is effective as of on November 1, 1986."0
A. Legislative History of the Sentencing Act
The legislative history of the Sentencing Act notes that the laws
which governed sentencing had been inflexible in providing judges
with a range of options from which to fashion an appropriate sen-
tence." 9 For example, under former laws, the maximum fines im-
1983); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir.
1976).
112. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 65.
113. Id.
114. Sentencing Act, supra note 20.
115. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 37.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 38.
118. See supra note 22.
119. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 50.
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posed were generally too small to provide punishment and deterrence
to major offenders,'" 0 and frequently did not come close to the
amount the defendant had gained by committing the offense.1"' The
legislative history further notes that shameful disparity in sentencing
had been a major flaw in the criminal justice system.1 22
In answer to these problems, the Sentencing Act provides a
comprehensive statement of the federal law of sentencing.12 3 It out-
lines the purposes of sentencing, describes in detail the kinds of
sentences which may be imposed to carry out those purposes, and
prescribes the factors that should be considered in determining the
kind of sentence to impose in a particular case. 2'
B. Presentence Report
To insure the appropriateness of the sentence imposed, a
presentence report is required by section 3552 of the Act.125 The
presentence report is prepared by a probation officer in accord with
the provisions of Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,"2 6 unless the trial court finds that it has sufficient information
to enable the meaningful exercise of authority pursuant to section
3553 of the Act.1 7 The provisions of section 3552 will thus provide
a court with the resources necessary to acquire adequate information
about a convicted offender, including recommendations from the pro-
bation system.12 Section 3552 also assures that the defendant and
the government have sufficient information concerning the basis for a




122. Id. at 65.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id.
125. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1988-89 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3552).
Section 3552(a) provides:
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND REPORT BY PROBATION OFFICER.-A
United States probation officer shall make a presentence investigation of a de-
fendant that is required pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and shall, before the imposition of sentence, re-
port the results of the investigation to the court.
Id.
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
127. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 71.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 74.
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C. Purposes of Sentencing
The Sentencing Act recognizes four purposes of sentencing: (1)
the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment; (2) the need to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the need to pro-
vide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other corrective treatment in the most effective manner. 80
The Sentencing Act explicitly states that an organization may
be sentenced to a term of probation or a fine, or to a combination of
both. "' Sections 3561 to 3566 govern the imposition, conditions, and
possible revocation of a sentence to a term of probation. "' In keep-
ing with modern criminal justice philosophy, probation is described
as a form of sentence rather than, as in the former law, a suspension
of the sentence.'3
D. General Provisions of the Sentencing Act
Section 3561 authorizes the imposition of a sentence to a term
of probation in all cases, unless the case involves a Class A or B
felony, an offense for which probation has been expressly precluded,
or unless the defendant is already sentenced at the same time for an
offense.' 4 The section also specifies the maximum permissible terms
130. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).
Section 3553(a)(2) provides:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Id.
131. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1988 (to be codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 (c)). Section 3551(c) provides:
ORGANIZATIONS.-An organization found guilty of an offense shall be sen-
tenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 3553, to-(1) a term of
probation as authorized by subchapter B; or (2) a fine as authorized by sub-
chapter C. A sentence to pay a fine may be imposed in addition to a sentence to
probation. A sanction authorized by section 3554, 3555, or 3556 may be im-
posed in addition to the sentence required by this subsection.
Id.
132. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 88.
133. Id.
134. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1992 (to be codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3561). Sec-
tion 3561 provides:
(a) IN GENERAL.-A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be
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of probation and requires a minimum of one year's probation for a
felony conviction. 188 Separate terms are set forth for felonies (not less
than one nor more than five years),'3 6 misdemeanors (not more than
five years),187 and infractions (not more than one year).1 8
Section 3562 sets forth the criteria to be considered by the court
in determining whether to impose a sentence of probation and in
determining the length of the term and the conditions of proba-
tion. 89 The application of the specific considerations requires the
court first to consider the nature of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the offender.1 40 With those in mind, the court must
then consider the four basic purposes of sentencing as established in
section 3553(a)(2)"41 to the extent that one or more of them are ap-
plicable to the case, 42 and must examine the sentencing guidelines
sentenced to a term of probation unless-Cl) the offense is a Class A or Class B
felony; (2) the offense is an offense for which probation has been expressly pre-
cluded; or (3) the defendant is sentenced at the same time to a term of imprison-
ment for the same or a different offense. The liability of a defendant for any
unexecuted fine or other punishment imposed as to which probation is granted
shall be fully discharged by the fulfillment of the terms and conditions of
probation.
(b) AUTHORIZED TERMS.-The authorized terms of probation are-(l) for a
felony, not less than one nor more than five years; (2) for a misdemeanor, not
more than five years; and (3) for an infraction, not more than one year.
Id.
135. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b)(1)). See supra note 134.
136. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1992.
137. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b)(2)). See supra note 134.
138. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1992 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b)(3)).
See supra note 134.
139. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1992 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3562). Sec-
tion 3562 provides:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A TERM OF PROBATION.-The
court, in determining whether to impose a term of probation, and, if a term of
probation is imposed, in determining the length of the term and the conditions
of probation, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable.
(b) EFFECT OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT.-Notwithstanding the fact that a sen-
tence of probation can subsequently be-.(I) modified or revoked pursuant to the
provisions of section 3564 or 3565; (2) corrected pursuant to the provisions of
rule 35 and section 3742; or (3) appealed and modified, if outside the guideline
range, pursuant to the provisions of section 3742; a judgment of conviction that
includes such a sentence constitutes a final judgment for all other purposes.
Id.
140. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).
141. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). See supra note 130.
142. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 77. "In setting out the four purposes of sentenc-
ing, the Committee has deliberately not shown a preference for one purpose of sentencing over
another in the belief that different purposes may play greater or lesser roles in sentencing for
different types of offenses committed by different types of defendants." Id.
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and policies' 4 3 of the Sentencing Commission.144 The effect of these
considerations is to require the court to focus carefully upon both the
needs of the corporate defendant and the needs of society.' 5
Section 3563 sets forth the conditions of probation, 4  Subsec-
tion (a) delineates the mandatory conditions of probation. 4 It speci-
fies that the court must provide (as a condition of probation for a
defendant convicted of any Federal offense) that the defendant not
commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term of
probation," 8 and (as a condition of probation for a defendant con-
victed of a felony) that the defendant pay a fine or restitution, or
engage in community service.'"4 Subsection (b) sets out the discre-
tionary conditions which may be imposed, the last of which makes it
clear that the enumeration is suggestive only, and is not intended to
be a limitation on the court's authority to consider and impose any
other appropriate conditions. 6 Subsection (c) permits the court, af-
ter a hearing, to modify or enlarge the conditions during the term of
probation, pursuant to the provisions applicable to the initial setting
of the conditions of probation. 5' Subsection (d) requires that the de-
143. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1990 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5)).
144. Id. at 2017 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1991).
145. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 75.
146. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1993-94 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563).
Section 3563 provides in pertinent part:
(a) MANDATORY CONDITIONS.-The court shall provide, as an explicit condi-
tion of a sentence of probation-(l) for a felony, a misdemeanor, or an infrac-
tion, that the defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime during
the term of probation; and (2) for a felony, that the defendant also abide by at
least one condition set forth in subsection (b)(2), (b)(3), or (b)(13). If the court
has imposed and ordered execution of a fine and placed the defendant on proba-
tion, payment of the fine or adherence to the court-established installment
schedule shall be a condition of the probation.
(b) DISCRETIONARY CONDITIONS.-The court may provide, as further condi-
tions of a sentence of probation, to the extent that such conditions are reasona-
bly related to the factors set forth in section 3553 (a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the
extent that such conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property
as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in section
3553(a)(2). ...
Id.
147. Id. at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)). See supra note 146.
148. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1)).
See supra note 146.
149. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1993 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2)).
See supra note 146.
150. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1993-94 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §3563(b)(20)). Section 3563(b)(20) provides that the defendant "satisfy such other conditions as
the court may impose." Id.
151. Id. at 1994 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c)). Section 3563(c) provides:
MODIFICA-tItONS OF CONDITIONS.-The court may, after a hearing, modify, re-
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fendant be provided with a written statement clearly describing the
probation conditions.
1 52
Section 3564 governs the commencement of a term of probation,
the effect of other sentences upon the running of the term, and the
court's power to terminate or extend a term of probation. "
Section 3565 provides that probation may be revoked if the de-
fendant violates a condition of probation, and specifies the period
during which such revocation may take place." 4
E. Sentencing Commission and Guidelines System
The Sentencing Act creates a United States Sentencing Com-
mission 55 (Sentencing Commission), which has the duty to promul-
gate sentencing guidelines and policy statements."' The Sentencing
Commission is part of the judicial branch and consists of seven mem-
bers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.157
duce, or enlarge the conditions of a sentence of probation at any time prior to
the expiration or termination of the term of probation, pursuant to the provi-
sions applicable to the initial setting of the conditions of probation.
Id.
152. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(d)). Section 3563(d) provides:
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CONDITIONS--The court shall direct that the pro-
bation officer provide the defendant with a written statement that sets forth all
the conditions to which the sentence is subject, and that is sufficiently clear and
specific to serve as a guide for defendant's conduct and for such supervision as is
required.
Id.
153. Id. at 1994 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3564).
154. Id. at 1995 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3565).
155. Id. at 2017-18 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991).
156. Id. at 2018 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)). Section 991(b) provides:
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to-
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system that-(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; (B) provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit in-
dividualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and (C)
reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
Id.
157. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 63.
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The Sentencing Act further creates a sentencing guidelines sys-
tem that is intended to treat consistently all classes of offenses com-
mitted by all categories of offenders consistently."' The sentencing
guidelines will recommend to the sentencing judge an appropriate
type and range of sentence."' These guidelines will be supplemented
by policy statements that will address questions concerning the ap-
propriate use of sanctions.' 0
The sentencing guidelines system will not remove all of the trial
court's discretion." Instead, it will guide the court in determining
the appropriate sentence."' If the court finds an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance in the case that was not adequately considered
in the formulation of the guidelines, the court may sentence the de-
fendant outside the guidelines.' 68 A sentence outside the guidelines
may be appealed by both the defendant""' and the state.'65 The caselaw that is developed in these appeals may, in turn, be used to refine
the guidelines.' 66
Similarly, the guidelines are not intended to be imposed in a
mechanical fashion. 67 The Sentencing Act recognizes that the sen-
tencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in
a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines if appropri-
ate.'68 The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a struc-
ture for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence
for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition
of sentences narrowly tailored to the needs of the defendant and the
community.'" Indeed, compared to the former law, the use of sen-
tencing guidelines under the Sentencing Act will actually enhancejudicial discretion in fashioning appropriate probationary
conditions.170
One of the best features of the Sentencing Act is the broad dis-
cretion given to the judge.17 ' In fact, broad judicial discretion is es-





163. Id. at 52.
164. See supra note 37.
165. Id.
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sential to the Sentencing Act.1" The Sentencing Act is based on the
realization that all criminal corporations are not alike; some need to
be sentenced with fines while others do not.178 Because each corpo-
rate offender is unique, judges need flexibility to tailor a sentence to
the particular circumstances of the offense. The discretion provided
by the Sentencing Act provides that flexibility. Within the flexibility
of judicial discretion, however, guidelines are necessary to achieve a
just and equitable application of probation to criminal corporations.
V. GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING PROBATION To CRIMINAL
CORPORATIONS
This comment proposes three guidelines to assist trial courts in
fashioning conditions of probation under the Sentencing Act. The
proposed guidelines are consistent with the goals of the Sentencing
Act174 as well as with the considerations of the Sentencing Commis-
sion.175 Thus, the guidelines proposed below will assist trial courts
in determining the most effective kinds of probationary conditions for
each corporate offender, as well as provide guidance in fashioning
consistent conditions of probation for criminal corporations.
A. Reasonable Relation
The first proposed guideline is that there must be a reasonable
relation between the condition of probation imposed and the goals of
the Sentencing Act. This "reasonable relation" guideline was judi-
cially formulated in Porth v. Templar 17 to aid courts in determining
the validity of the proposed conditions of probation on appeal.
177
This "reasonable relation" guideline has also been enunciated by the
American Bar Association in its Standards Relating to Probation,
which provides a more concise definition: "The conditions must
achieve a balance between oppression and necessity, between inter-
ference and utility. 1
7' 8
In determining whether a condition of probation is permissible,
the purpose of probation should be balanced against the harshness of
the condition imposed. When a condition serves a substantial pur-
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Senate Report, supra note 19. See also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
176. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
177. Id. at 333.




pose of the Sentencing Act and is not disproportionate to the offense,
the condition is valid. For example, in United States v. Allied Chem-
ical1"9 the defendant corporation was convicted and fined $13.24
million for water pollution which resulted from the escape of its pes-
ticides into Virginia waterways. 8" The trial court, however, stated
that it would be inclined to reduce the sentence if Allied Chemical
took steps to alleviate the damage it had caused.18' The imposed pro-
bation sentence incorporated three of the purposes set forth in the
Sentencing Act. Retribution was accomplished through the clean-up
of the pollution. Rehabilitation and protection of the public were ac-
complished through the requirement that Allied Chemical employees
work towards rectifying the damage caused by their corporation by
establishing an environmental protection program. These conditions
imposed were clearly "reasonably related" to several purposes of
sentencing under the Act,' 82 and would therefore be valid under this
proposed guideline.
B. Work Within The Corporation
The second proposed guideline is that a condition of probation
should affect the people of the corporation. Corporations are not
"bloodless entities""' but consist of people who make decisions and
take actions which lead to criminal conduct by the corporate en-
tity. 84 When a condition of probation works with the people respon-
sible for the offense, the effect is to internalize the punishment
within the structure of the organization. This is opposed to the effect
of a fine, which may be externalized by passing the penalty onto
shareholders or consumers.' Thus, in order for probation to be ef-
fective, a condition of probation must involve those people within the
corporation who were responsible for the offense.
179. 420 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976).
180. Fisse, supra note 71, at 974.
181. Stone, supra note 72, at 8.
182. See Senate Report, supra note 19. See also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
183. William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 914.
184. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. See also William Anderson, 698
F.2d at 914.
[A corporation's] decision-making processes, acting through human agents, af-
fect for weal or for woe the daily life of many communities. That such decision-
making processes can not be affected, in the area of collusive or monopolistic
pricing or other illegal restraints of trade, by rehabilitative measures and puni-
tive sanctions is an argument divorced from reality. Insistence upon the fiction
theory of corporations is today itself a fiction.
Id.
185. See generally Coffee, supra note 4, 400-02.
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The effectiveness of this proposed guideline is exemplified in
Danilow" where six wholesale bakeries were convicted of price fix-
ing.18 7 In Danilow, one of the probationary conditions of the sen-
tence required the corporations to perform community service by
providing their products at no charge to needy members of the com-
munity.1 88 In sentencing the defendant corporations, the court noted
that rehabilitation and specific deterrence against future price fixing
would be enhanced by the participation of the executives and work-
ers in satisfying the conditions of probation. Through their individ-
ual community service, the executives and workers would be made
aware of the violations committed by their corporations, and of the
need to guard against similar violations in the future.' 9
C. "Tailored" Conditions
The third proposed guideline for sentencing criminal corpora-
tions to probation is that the conditions of probation should be "tai-
lored" to the needs of the defendant and to the needs of the commu-
nity. This guideline was first enunciated in United States v.
Tonry."O The court stated that "probation conditions must be tai-
lored to meet the special problems of a particular defendant."' 1 In
applying this guideline, a trial court should first consider the history
and characteristics of the defendant corporation,"' then the nature
and circumstances of the offense," 83 and finally the defendant's need
for educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
tional treatment.'"
The importance of this guideline was expressed in the concerns
of the sentencing judge in United States v. Mitsubishi International
Corp. 9 In Mitsubishi, the corporate defendants were guilty of nu-
merous violations of the Elkins Act."' Although a substantial fine
could have been imposed, the judge expressed his concern that the
large corporation could just "write a check and walk away. '" It
186. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
187. Id. at 1162.
188. Id. at 1163.
189. Id. at 1167.
190. 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979).
191. Id. at 148.
192. Sentencing Act, supra note 20, at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1989 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)).
195. 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
196. Id. at 786.
197. Id. at 788.
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was for this reason that the trial court tailored the sentence to fit the
needs of society as well as those of the defendants." 8 Essentially, the
probation conditions required each defendant corporation to loan an
executive for one year to the National Alliance for Business in devel-
opment of its Community Alliance Program for Ex-Offenders
(CAPE). 99 The defendants were also required to submit for court
approval an operating plan as well as annual reports regarding the
use of funds and the performances of the defendant corporations in
support of the CAPE program.2"' By tailoring these "unique and
creative"'' 1 conditions of probation to the circumstances of the case,
the trial court imposed a meaningful sentence that better served the
purposes of sentencing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has analyzed and discussed the application of
probation to criminal corporations under the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984. The factors of consideration have been the traditional sanc-
tions for criminal corporations, a brief history of attempts to impose
probationary conditions, and the Sentencing Act. The traditional
sanctions of fines and dissolution have been ineffective to control cor-
porate criminal behavior. Although the cases in which probation has
been applied to corporations have demonstrated the viability of pro-
bation as a sanction, they too have remained ineffective due to the
limitations of the former law and the lack of definitive guidelines for
future courts to follow.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides a comprehensive
and coherent Federal sentencing law which addresses the limitations
of the preceding law. It contains procedural requirements that will
prevent abuses of probation as a sanction. The Sentencing Act also
establishes a Sentencing Commission responsible for promulgating
guidelines to assist a judge in sentencing criminal corporations.
This comment has proposed guidelines to be adopted by the
Sentencing Commission and the judiciary. These guidelines adhere
to the Sentencing Act's stated purpose of sentencing as well as to the
spirit of the application of probation to corporations in past case law.
The implementation of these proposed guidelines will enhance the
development of probation as a sanction against a criminal corpora-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 787 n.I.
200. Id. at 787.
201. Id. at 788.
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tion. Above all, these guidelines will assist courts in fashioning ap-
propriate conditions of probation in sentencing criminal corporations
under the Sentencing Act.
James D. Curran
